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INTRODUCTION

In the last decade of the twentieth century, the condition of American
inner cities remains precarious. Many large central cities, particularly those
in the Northeast and Midwest, continue to lose population and jobs as infrastructure and public services deteriorate in response to fiscal constraints.
Concerns about crime and the breakdown of social order are omnipresent,
even in cities where the statistics do not bear out these negative perceptions. Significantly, the problems of urban America are not distributed
evenly throughout all neighborhoods. To the contrary, in many inner city
neighborhoods, the concentrated effects of high rates of unemployment,
poverty, and social disorder have made these areas communities in name
only.
Traditional government community and economic development initiatives have had little impact in rebuilding distressed inner city neighborhoods. Nevertheless, in many instances, residents themselves are taking
* Professor of Law and Urban Planning, New York University and Director, New
York University School of Law Center For Real Estate and Urban Policy. I would like to
thank Kammie Gormezano for research assistance. I am also indebted to dozens of community development professionals who shared their views and experiences with me. The views
expressed in this article are my own, however, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of
the Center For Real Estate and Urban Policy or its Board of Advisors.
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matters into their own hands and forming voluntary organizations to improve their communities. These nonprofit, community development corporations (CDCs) have historically focussed their efforts on housing
production and management. Increasingly, however, CDCs are either engaging in or contemplating community economic development activities
such as building commercial real estate projects or beginning business enterprises in inner city neighborhoods.
In this article, I examine the economic development activities of
CDCs. Although the phrase "economic development" is sometimes used
to refer to all activities of CDCs, I will use the term to refer only to activities whose primary purposes are the creation of jobs and the delivery of
commercial services. Housing development and political advocacy are
therefore not the focus of this article.' Part I describes the economic and
social conditions existing in many of the cities and neighborhoods in which
CDCs operate. Part II examines why traditional economic development
initiatives have had limited impact in spurring the growth of enterprise and
employment in inner city neighborhoods. In Part III, I describe the growth
of CDCs and their contributions to community development. Finally, in
Part IV, I examine the role of CDCs in economic development and comment more broadly on community economic development as a strategy for
assisting residents of inner city neighborhoods.
I.
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS OF INNER CITIES

The last half of this century has not been a kind one for large central
cities, particularly the older ones located in the Northeast and Midwest.
After decades of explosive population growth, many of these cities have
experienced enormous population losses. Of the 15 largest central cities in
1950, 13 lost population in the succeeding four decades.2 Among these cities, 5 lost over one-fifth of their populations and an additional 5 cities had
3
losses in excess of two-fifths.
1. For a discussion of the housing activities of CDCs, see Michael H. Schill, The Role of
the Nonprofit Sector in Low-Income Housing Production:A Comparative Perspective, 30

URB. Aii. Q. 74 (1994). For a discussion of the political advocacy efforts of CDCs, see
Benjamin B. Quinones, Redevelopment Redefined: Revitalizing the Central City with Resident Control, 27 U. MICH. L.J. REFORM 689, 753-58, 769-71 (1994).
2. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM., 1970 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 20-21; BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM.,
CAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 44-46.

1994

STATISTI-

3. The five that lost over 20% of their population were Chicago, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, D.C., and Boston. Detroit, Cleveland, St. Louis, Buffalo, and Pittsburgh
lost over 40% of their populations during the period 1950-1990. New York City lost 7.2% of
its population during this period. The cities which were among the 15 largest in the United
States in 1950 that had population gains were Los Angeles and Houston. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM., 1970 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 20-21;
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM., 1994 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 44-46.
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Among the many causes of central city decline is the loss of jobs many
of these cities have experienced. 4 As a result of changing technologies,
suburbanization, and competition from the Sunbelt and overseas, the sector that experienced the greatest decline in older central cities is manufacturing. An analysis of employment patterns in five northern cities (New
York, Philadelphia, Boston, Baltimore, and St. Louis) indicates that each
lost over half of their manufacturing jobs between 1970 and 1990. s Losses
of manufacturing jobs were not in all cases limited to central cities. Suburbs also frequently experienced declines in manufacturing employment
although these losses were a fraction of those endured by central cities.6
As they lost their manufacturing bases, most central cities have also
experienced an increase in employment in service industries. 7 Nevertheless, the growth of the service sector has typically not prevented hardships
on the part of those who formerly would have been employed in manufacturing. Manufacturing jobs historically provided a point of entry for unskilled laborers and those with modest educational backgrounds. Service
sector jobs, however, frequently demand relatively higher levels of education and skills. These trends are particularly troubling when viewed in conjunction with the large number of central city residents who have modest
educational backgrounds. In 1990, over one-quarter of the residents of
large central cities in the United States over the age of 25 had not completed high school.8 In the Northeast this proportion approaches onethird. 9

The weakening labor market position of relatively unskilled and uneducated city dwellers is reflected in a recent study by Kasarda.10 He examined two categories of industries: those whose employees, on average,
4. For a discussion of the causes of central city decline, see KENNETH T. JACKSON,

(1985).
5. John D. Kasarda, Industrial Restructuring and the Changing Location of Jobs, in 1
STATE OF THE UNION: AmERICA IN THE 1990s 215, 241-42 (Reynolds Farley ed., 1995).
6. See DENIS R. JuDD & TODD SwANSROM, CITY PoriTcs: PRIVATE POWER & PUBuc POLICY 343 (1994) (observing that from 1977 through 1987 the central cities of the 10
largest metropolitan areas in the United States lost 464,000 manufacturing jobs (22.9% decrease) whereas their suburbs lost 137,000 manufacturing jobs (4.6% decrease)).
7. Nevertheless, the expanding service sectors in cities such as New York, Philadelphia,
Baltimore, and St. Louis have not generated a sufficient number of jobs to offset the losses
in manufacturing. See Kasarda,supra note 5, at 241-42.
8. William H. Frey, People In Places:DemographicTrends in Urban America, in REDISCOVERING URBAN AMERICA: PERSPECTIVES ON THE 1980s 3-36,3-98 (Jack Sommer & Donald A. Hicks eds., 1993). Frey's calculations are for central cities in metropolitan areas with
populations over one million. In the suburbs of these metropolitan areas 18.5% of adults
lacked a high school degree. Id.
9. Id.
10. See Kasarda,supra note 5, at 248-49. See also John Bound & Henry J. Holzer,
CRABGRASS FRONTIER

IndustrialShifts, Skills Levels, and the Labor Market For White and Black Males, 75 REv.
EcoN. & STAT. 387, 395 (1993) (finding that the decline in manufacturing accounted for as

much as one-half to one-third of the reductions in employment among young and less-educated blacks).
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had fewer than twelve years of education and those whose employees typically had at least one year of higher education. From 1970 through 1990,
each of the large cities in the Northeast and Midwest he examined experienced a decline in the number of jobs requiring low educational "requirements" and an increase in jobs with high educational backgrounds. For
example, from 1970 through 1990, Philadelphia lost almost half of its jobs
in industries with low average educational credentials while experiencing a
13% increase in industries that typically employ people who have some
post-secondary school education."
While most large Northeastern and Midwestern central cities were experiencing dramatic decreases in economic opportunities for modestly educated individuals over the past two decades, the number of jobs for low
skilled people in the suburbs of these cities were either increasing or declining at a much lower rate than central cities. 12 Furthermore, in some
Southern and Western cities the number of unskilled jobs actually
13
increased.
Even in those metropolitan areas where significant numbers of low
skilled jobs exist or are being created, they are often located beyond the
reach of central city residents. 4 High housing prices outside the central
city, fostered in part by restrictive government land use regulations,"5 make
it difficult or impossible for low income inner city residents to move close
to new sources of employment. In addition, the dispersed locations of suburban firms and plants make it impossible for many low income households
to utilize public transit to commute to and from their existing residences in

11. Kasarda, supra note 5, at 248-49.
12. See id. at 220,235. But cf. Arthur C. Nelson, Regional Patternsof Exurban Industrialization:Results of A PreliminaryInvestigation, 4 ECON. Drv. Q. 320, 327-30 (1990) (observing that manufacturing employment increased in the suburbs of the Midwest, South and
West).
13. For example, of the four cities in Kasarda's study that were not located in the
Northeast and Midwest, three (Atlanta, Dallas, and San Francisco) experienced increases in
industries with higher than average proportions of low skilled jobs. See Kasarda, supra note
5, at 249.
14. This "spatial mismatch hypothesis" has been subjected to extensive empirical scrutiny. Most recent studies have supported the argument that the residential location of central city low income households disadvantages them in obtaining jobs in the suburbs. For
recent reviews of the literature on the spatial mismatch hypothesis, see Keith Ihlanfeldt, The
Spatial Mismatch Between Jobs and Residential Locations Within Urban Areas, 1 CiTYSCAPE
219 (1994); John F. Kain, The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis: Three Decades Later, 3 Hous.
INC POL'Y DEBATE 371 (1992); Michael H. Schill, Deconcentratingthe Inner City Poor, 67
CHI-KENT L. REv. 795, 799-804 (1991).
15. See Schill, supra note 14, at 811-18; Michael H. Schill & Susan M. Wachter, Housing
Market Constraints and Spatial Stratification by Income and Race, 6 HoUSING POL'Y De.
BATE 141, 142-48 (1995) (examining empirical evidence showing that local government regulations increase the price of housing).
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the central city. Furthermore, inner city residents are at a competitive disadvantage in obtaining these jobs because physical distance is often negatively correlated with information about job openings.16 Inner city job
seekers who overcome physical and informational barriers may still find
that their place of residence harms their chances for obtaining suburban
employment due to stereotypes that portray people from the inner city as
unreliable and,17therefore, unsuitable employees, stereotypes that many employers share.
In conjunction with other factors such as race discrimination and the
migration of middle income households to the suburbs, deindustrialization
and the spatial mismatch of jobs and residences have generated enormous
demographic disparities within American metropolitan areas.18 In 1960,
the per capita income of central city residents exceeded that of suburbanites. By 1990, however, central city per capita income was only 84% of the
average for suburbs. 19 In many large metropolitan areas such as New
York, St. Louis, and Minneapolis, the disparities are even greater with incomes of citydwellers at about two-thirds the level of suburban residents. °
The proportion of people living in poverty is also much higher in central cities. In central cities in 1990, 18% of all residents had incomes that
were lower than federally prescribed poverty levels, compared with 8% of
suburban residents.21 By 1993, this disparity widened even further as central cities experienced an average poverty rate of 22% compared to 10% in
the suburbs32 Again, aggregate numbers obscure much greater disparities
in individual metropolitan areas. For example, the poverty rates for Philadelphia and Chicago exceeded 20% in 1990 whereas their suburbs had poverty rates that were less than 5%P3
Within central cities, the absence of job opportunities, high rates of
unemployment, racial discrimination, and racial segregation have taken
16. Katherine M. O'Reagan & John M. Quigley, LaborMarket Access and LaborMarket Outcomes For Urban Youth, 21 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. EcoN. 277, 290 (1991).
17. See Joleen Kirschenman & Kathryn M. Neckerman, "We'd Love to Hire Them,
But. . . The Meaning of Race for Employers, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 203, 215-17
(Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991) (describing stereotyping of potential
employees by their residential location).
18. Another factor contributing to intrametropolitan disparities is the concentration
effects of living in neighborhoods of concentrated poverty. See infra text accompanying
notes 29-33.

19. William R. Barnes & Larry C. Ledebur, Local Economies: The U.S. Common larket of Local Economic Regions 13 (Dec. 8-9, 1994) (unpublished paper on file vith the
Review of Law & Social Change).
20. H.V. Savitch & Ron Vogel, Regional Patterns in A Post City Age 7 (Dec. 8-9,1994)
(unpublished paper on file with the Review of Law & Social Change).
21. Frey, supra note 8, at 3-36.
22. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM., CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS,
P60-188, INCOME, POVERTY AND VALUATION OF NONCASH BENEFITS: 1993 27-28.

SERIES

23. In Atlanta, the discrepancy is even greater, with a 26% poverty rate in the city as
compared to 7% in the suburbs. Frey, supra note 8, at 3-100.
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their toll.24 Low-income, predominantly nonwhite people2 s are increasingly living in economically segregated neighborhoods, spatially isolated
from the rest of the city. From 1970 through 1990, the number of people
living in the one hundred largest cities in census tracts where over 40% of
the population had incomes below the poverty level ("extreme poverty
tracts") jumped from 2.7 million to 5.5 million.26 This increase constituted
a doubling of the percentage of city population living in extreme poverty
tracts, from 5.2% in 1970 to 10.7% in 1990.27 In terms of space, the spread
of concentrated poverty was even more dramatic with the number of extreme poverty tracts growing from 751 to 1,954.28
Concentrated inner city poverty generates problems that are different
both in kind and in magnitude from those experienced by poor people in
less isolated settings. William Julius Wilson has argued that the geographic
isolation of poor people generates behavioral adaptations called "concentration effects. 29 Specifically, children growing up in neighborhoods with
few employed role models may develop weak attachments to the labor
force.3" Lacking employment opportunities and the appropriate socialization to seek work, youths will frequently engage in deviant or illegal activities to earn income and gain status, thereby further distancing themselves
from middle class norms.3 ' These behaviors are reinforced by local peer
groups. Activities that are likely to assist young people in obtaining employment and social mobility, such as graduating from high school, are stigmatized rather than valued.3 2

24. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEORE.
115-47 (1993) (discussing how racial segre-

GATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS

gation contributes to concentrated inner city poverty).
25. According to the 1990 Census of Population and Housing, with respect to the 100
largest cities in the United States, more than 80% of all people living in census tracts where
over 40% of the population have incomes below the poverty level are either black or Hispanic. John D. Kasarda, Inner-City ConcentratedPoverty and NeighborhoodDistress: 1970
to 1990, 4 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 253, 263 (1993).

26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 258.
29. WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 58 (1987) [hereinafter WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVAN.
TAGED]; see also WILLIAM J. WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW
URBAN POOR 66 (1996).
30. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED, supra note 29, at 56-57.
31. See id. at 58; see also William J. Wilson, Studying Inner-City Social Dislocations:
The Challenge of PublicAgenda Research, 56 AM. Soc. REV. 1, 12 (1991) ("The issue is not
simply that the underclass or ghetto poor have a marginal position in the labor market ...it
is also that their economic position is uniquely reinforced by their social milieu.").
32. Massey and Denton argue that youths living in neighborhoods of concentrated poverty adopt "oppositional cultures" to protect their self esteem and engender the esteem of
their peers. One of the most harmful elements of this culture is the devaluation of academic
success as "acting white." See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 24, at 167-76.
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Wilson's concentration effects hypothesis has received almost universal empirical confirmation. Although the precise causal mechanism remains a matter of debate, studies testing the theory demonstrate a
consistent relationship between social and spatial isolation on the one
hand, and high rates of teenage childbearing, school dropouts, and welfare
dependency on the other.3 3
II.

THE LIMIrrATIONS OF TRADrrIONAL
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN iATrvEs

URiAN

The absence of economic opportunities for inner city residents is both
a cause and a result of the declining fortunes of central cities in America.
The loss of employment has created an environment where people of limited skills and education have little likelihood of obtaining jobs that will
lead to substantial economic mobility. People living in inner city communities, may, when faced with few opportunities for economic mobility, question the legitimacy of middle class norms and adopt behaviors that many
associate with the "underclass." At the same time, firms do not locate in
cities or neighborhoods where they will be unable to attract a workforce
with the necessary skills, both technical and behavioral. Furthermore, high
rates of inner city crime and other negative externalities deter firms from
locating in the communities which need them the most.
For decades, federal, state, and local governments have utilized a wide
array of tools to spur economic development in central cities. Among the
most commonly utilized mechanisms are tax abatements or reductions, below market interest rate loans, and grants. In this section, I will examine
why traditional economic development programs have had only a limited
impact in generating economic opportunities for persons living in inner city
neighborhoods.
33. See Elijah Anderson, NeighborhoodEffects on Teenage Pregnancy,in THE URBAN
UNDERCLASS 375, 382-97 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991) (describing

cultural explanations for teenage pregnancy in ghetto communities); see also Jeanne
Brooks-Gunn, Greg J. Duncan, Pamela K. Klebanov, &Naomi Sealand, Do Neighborhoods
Influence Childand Adolescent Development?, 99 Aht. J. Soc. 353, 355 (1993) (noting that
the presence of affluent neighbors impacts upon the likelihood that teenagers vil have
children and drop out of school); Rebecca L. Clark, Neighborhood Effects on Dropping Out
of School Among Teenage Boys 16-21 (Urban Institute Discussion Paper PSC-DSC-UI-13,
Dec. 1992) (noting that rates of school drop-outs among boys increase as the proportion of
poor households in a community increases, and as the proportion of households employed
in middle-class occupations declines, although the results do not support a contagion theory); Jonathan Crane, The Epidemic Theory of Ghettos andNeighborhoodEffects on Dropping Out and Teenage Childbearing,96 Am. J. Soc. 1226, 1236-41 (1991) (explaining that as
the proportion of high status job-holders in a community declines, teenage pregnancy and
the rate of school drop-outs increases exponentially, thereby supporting the contagion
model); Paul Osterman, Welfare Participationin a Full Employment Economy. The Impact
of Neighborhood, 38 Soc. PROB. 475, 486 (1991) (explaining that neighborhoods affect
whether an individual receives public assistance).
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Until relatively recently, the common wisdom among economists was
that policies to spur economic development such as lower taxes would have
little impact on job growth. These analyses, based in part upon surveys of
firm managers, indicated that other factors such as the availability of expansion space, a capable workforce, and access to markets were more important than local fiscal policy in influencing where firms would locate. 4
Furthermore, given the ubiquity of tax concessions and incentive programs,
some commentators have suggested that public sector economic development efforts are a zero sum game.35
Nevertheless more recent and sophisticated studies of the impact of
taxes on firm location have tended to support the proposition that local tax
rates can have a significant impact on firm location decisions. For example,
after reviewing empirical studies published between 1979 and 1990 on state
and local metropolitan job growth, Bartik concluded that 40 of the 57 analyses estimated at least one tax effect that was negative and statistically significant.36 Among studies that controlled for the level of public services
provided by the taxing unit, the average long-run elasticity of business activity to state and local taxes was -. 33.37 In other words, a 10% reduction in
state and local business taxes would be expected to yield an increase in
business activity of 3.3%.38
It is important to note that the studies finding significant impacts of tax
reductions on economic development were based upon samples consisting
of state or local jurisdictions dominated by suburbs. The studies, therefore,
may have limited relevance to central cities since suburbs may be imperfect
substitutes for large cities. 39 Researchers who have examined the impact of
tax differentials on the relative share of central city economic activity have
not consistently found statistically significant effects4 0
Tax incentives for business enterprise are just one weapon in a large
arsenal of local economic development tools. Many states and cities also
34. See, e.g., Susan S. Jacobs & Michael Wasylenko, Government Policy to Stimulate
Economic Development: EnterpriseZones, in FINANCING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
IN THE 1980s 175, 187 (Norman Walzer & David L. Chicoine eds., 1981) (concluding that
labor supply and external economies are important factors); Roger W. Schmenner, IndustrialLocation and Urban PublicManagement, in THE PROSPEcrlvE CIr'T 446,457 (asserting

that space needs are important).
35. See, e.g., Barry M. Rubin & C. Kurt Zom, Sensible State and Local Economic Development, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 333, 334 (1985) (observing that economic development

officials are engaged in a zero sum game).
36. Timothy J. Bartik, The Effects of State and Local Taxes on Economic Development:
A Review of Recent Research, 6 ECON. DEv. Q. 102, 103 (1992).
37. Id.

38. Id. at 105-06. Bartik constructed a confidence interval for the elasticity estimate
and found that 95% of the time one would expect the elasticity to fall within the range of .15 and -.85.

39. See id. at 107.
40. See id. at 108.
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provide direct subsidies to firms that locate within their borders. For example, some offer firms tax exempt financing, loan guarantees, grants, tax
credits, infrastructure improvements, and land writedowns. One commentator estimated that about three-quarters of all manufacturing location decisions involve some form of public sector assistance. 4 1
Compared to research on the effects of taxes on firm location, empirical analyses of the impact of government incentives is embryonic. Several
studies of tax exempt financing have found no statistically significant impact on employment growth.42 Two recent studies, however, provide some,
albeit limited, evidence that public sector economic development incentives can affect local employment growth. Loh reports that the dollar value
of state grants to businesses was significantly related to county employment
growth in the State of Ohio from 1982 to 1990, although the value of loans
was not.4 3 Similarly, Goss and Phillips find that state economic development spending during the 1980s was positively related to employment
growth in those states."
Therefore, based upon recent empirical literature, it appears that
traditional state and local economic development policies are not merely a
zero sum game, but can increase aggregate employment.4 s Whether these
policies can have a large impact on central cities, however, remains unsettled. Furthermore, even if one assumes that the public sector can influence
firms to locate in large central cities, there is reason to doubt that residents
of predominantly low income inner city communities would benefit from
the jobs generated.
Increased demand for labor attributable to economic development initiatives is likely to be satisfied not solely by existing city residents, but also
by people who commute from outside the city. In addition, over time,
households would be expected to migrate to the city in response to the
increased demand. Indeed, one review of the literature suggests that in the

41. JoHN P. BLAIR, URBAN & REGIONAL ECONOMIcs 39 (1991).

42. See Eng Seng Loh, The Effects of Jobs-TargetedDevelopment Incentive Programs,

24 GROWTH & CHANGE 365, 366 (1993) (revieving studies demonstrating that the volume

of revenue bonds issued by states is generally not a statistically significant variable in explaining state or county employment growth).
43. See id. at 371-73. Loh also found that capital subsidies to businesses were more
effective than labor subsidies in spurring employment growth. Id.
44. Ernest Preston Goss & Joseph M. Phillips, State Employment Growth: The Impact
of Taxes and Economic Development Agency Spending, 25 GRomrr & CHANQE 287, 296
(1994).
45. Although public sector economic development activities may, in some instances,
increase aggregate employment, they may not promote economic efficiency. Firms may
choose locations that would be less than optimal absent the public sector subsidy. In addition, subsidies for labor or capital may distort the efficient allocation of societal resources.
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long run, migrants will absorb between 60% and 90% of all incremental job
growth.46
Although economic research suggests that central city residents would
attain employment in at least some of the jobs created as a result of economic development initiatives, there is no guarantee that these jobs would
go to residents of inner city, low income neighborhoods. Indeed, there are
many reasons to be skeptical about the prospect of employers hiring and
retaining large numbers of residents of these communities. First, a sizable
proportion of the people living in neighborhoods of extreme poverty will
not have the skills necessary to qualify for employment. According to
Kasarda, more than half of the people over the age of 25 who live in extreme poverty neighborhoods have not completed high school. 47 Furthermore, many of the residents, particularly the young, have not regularly
worked and48may lack the discipline necessary to successfully hold conventional jobs.
On the demand side, there is also reason to believe that employers
might fail to hire otherwise qualified residents of predominantly low income neighborhoods. Residents of extremely poor neighborhoods in central cities are overwhelmingly nonwhite.49 Studies repeatedly show that
nonwhites are significantly under-represented as employees of firms that
are owned and operated by white individuals.50 The relative absence of

46. Timothy J. Bartik, Who Benefits from Local Job Growth: Migrants or the Original
Residents?, 27 REGIONAL STUD. 297,303 (1993). See also TIMOTHY J. BARTIK,

WHO BENS.

(1991) (estimating
that over three-quarters of all new jobs from growth would be absorbed by in-migrants).
47. Kasarda, supra note 25, at 273.
48. See WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED, supra note 29, at 60-61 (observing that
"inner-city social isolation also generates behavior not conducive to good work histories.
The patterns of behavior that are associated with a life of casual work (tardiness and absenteeism) are quite different from those that accompany a life of regular or steady work (e.g.,
the habit of waking up early in the morning to a ringing alarm clock)."); Cf. Ronald B.
Mincy, Introduction, in NURTURING YOUNG BLACK MALES 7, 21 (Ronald Mincy ed., 1994)
(describing how "street culture" may negatively impact employment opportunities).
An additional reason inner city residents may not attain newly created jobs is that they
are not tied into the informal networks that would inform them of job openings. See
Timothy Bates & Constance R. Dunham, FacilitatingUpward Mobility Through Small Business Ownership, in URBAN LABOR MARKETS AND JOB OPPORTUNITY 239, 270 (George E.
FITS FROM STATE AND LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICIES? 95

Peterson & Wayne Vroman eds., 1992) (observing that whites rely on social networks and
referrals to obtain jobs more than blacks); cf. Roberto M. Fernandez & David Harris, Social
Isolationand the Underclass,in DRUGS, CRIME, AND SOCIAL ISOLATION: BARRIERS TO UR.
BAN OPPORTUNITY 257, 287-89 (Adele V. Harrell & George E. Peterson eds., 1992) (observing that poor blacks are more often socially isolated than working blacks, but that
neighborhood poverty concentration seems to have little impact on this isolation).
49. Kasarda, supra note 25, at 263.
50. E.g., Timothy Bates, Utilization of Minority Employees in Small Business: A Comparison of Nonminority and Black-Owned Urban Enterprises, REV. BLACK POL. ECON.,
Summer 1994, at 113, 118 (finding that over half of the small businesses owned by white
individuals in 28 large metropolitan areas had no minority employees on the payroll).
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minority employees may be attributable in part to the lower skills and educational qualifications of the nonwhite workforce.51 In addition, there is
substantial evidence to indicate that employers continue to discriminate in
hiring based upon race.52
Finally, the use by employers of stereotypes may disadvantage residents of inner city communities. Interviews by Kirschenman and Neckerman of 186 employers in Chicago reflected the view that the "innercity... connoted black, poor, uneducated, unskilled, lacking in values,

crime, gangs, drugs and unstable families. 5 3
Therefore, for a combination of factors, traditional state and local economic development programs are unlikely to have a major effect in improving inner city employment opportunities. It is possible, however, that
economic development initiatives which are targeted to these neighborhoods may have a greater impact. One type of targeted economic development program is the enterprise zone.
Enterprise zones have their roots in a series of urban initiatives in
Great Britain during the 1980s that sought to promote the revitalization of
inner city areas by targeting regulatory and tax relief to firms located in
these neighborhoods 4 Despite much debate in Congress, the federal government did not enact a major enterprise zone initiative until 1993.5- Nevertheless, between 1982 and 1992 thirty-seven states adopted their own
enterprise zone programs.56 There is tremendous variance among the
51. See, e.g.,

GERALD D. JAYNES & ROBIN M WILumis,
,
A CohiMoN DEsTINY:
N ADMERcCAN SoclErv 332-54 (1989) (showing an increasing similarity between
the number of years that blacks attend school, a relative decline in black college attendance
and comparatively lower levels of black educational achievement); Mincy, supra note 48 at
10-15 (describing black/white discrepancies in education and skills); Nan L Maxwell, The
Effects on Black-White Wage Differences of Differences in the Quantity and Quality of Education, 47 INDuS. & LAB.REL. REV. 249, 253 (1994) (showing that despite some convergence since 1970, black individuals lag behind whites in median years of schooling, college
attendance and completion of high school).
52. See, e.g., Marc Bendick, Jr., Charles NV. Jackson & Victor A. Reinoso, Measuring
Employment Discrimination Through Controlled Experiments, REv. BLACK PO. ECON.,
Summer 1994, at 25, 30 (summarizing studies that demonstrate that white job applicants
have a higher probability of being offered jobs than similarly situated minority applicants);
Ronald B. fMincy, The Urban Institute Audit Studies: Their Research and Policy Context, in

BLACKS

CLEAR AND CONVINCING EvIDENCE - MEASUREMIENT OF DiscmuNAl-rON IN AMERICA

165

(Michael Fix & Raymond J. Struyk eds., 1992) (reviewing studies demonstrating the continued existence of employment discrimination based upon race).
53. Kirschenman & Neckerman, supra note 17, at 215.
54. For a description of the British enterprise zone program, see Peter Hall, The British
Enterprise Zones, in ENTERPRISE ZoNEs: NEw Di PEcONS IN ECONO1tc DEvELoPbiENr
179 (Roy E. Green ed., 1991) [hereinafter ErERPRISE ZoNs].
55. For a description of the Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Community Program enacted by Congress in 1993, see infra text accompanying notes 67-6S.
56. See Rodney A. Erickson, EnterpriseZones: Lessons from the State Government Experience, in SouRcEs OF METROPOLITAN GROWTH 161, 162 (Edwin S. ills & John F. McDonald eds., 1992) (describing a study of 39 enterprise zone programs which demonstrates
that the legislative intent behind the programs often includes welfare development and job
creation).
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states in the precise structures of their enterprise zone programs. The most
common elements are incentives for entrepreneurs to invest capital in a
limited number of distressed communities. These incentives typically include property, sales, and investment tax credits. Many states also subsidize investments in labor through tax credits for each employee hired.
Some of these labor subsidies may be earmarked for57formerly unemployed
persons or for employees who live within the zone.
State enterprise zone programs have typically generated mixed reviews. One study of 357 enterprise zones in 17 states found that, on average, employers in each zone created or saved 175 jobs. 58 Although the
authors expressed some doubt as to whether zone designation had more
than a marginal impact on job creation, they concluded that in several instances, the zones played a "catalytic role."'5 9 Rubin's analysis of New
Jersey exhibits less ambivalence in concluding that enterprise zones are a
"cost-effective economic development tool, leveraging almost $2.00 in
' 60
State and local taxes for every $1.00 foregone in State tax revenues."
Other analyses are much less positive. For example, a General Accounting Office study of three zones in Maryland found that although employment increased in each of the designated areas, the increases were not
attributable to zone designation. Based upon surveys with firm owners in
each zone, the authors of the study concluded that location decisions were
not influenced by the financial advantages offered by the program.61 Other
analyses of enterprise zones in Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, and Ohio found
modest employment growth in zones despite relatively large costs in terms
of tax revenue foregone. 62 One recent review of the literature on enterprise zones concludes that "the zones have not proved to be a cost-effective
means of providing jobs"' 63 while another argues that they "do not appear
57. Id. at 165-72.
58. Id. at 175 (reporting that the median number of new jobs created or saved in zones
was 175; the mean was 464).
59. See id. at 178 (noting higher investment and job gains in the zones).
60. Marilyn M. Rubin, Urban EnterpriseZones in New Jersey: Have They Made A Difference, inENTERPRISE ZONES, supra note 54, at 105, 118. Rubin's results have been somewhat controversial. See Franklin J. James, The Evaluation of EnterpriseZone Programs,in
ENTERPRISE ZONES, supra note 54, at 225, 228, 237 (arguing that Rubin's study does not
sufficiently control for economic trends outside the zone and understates cumulative costs);
Helen F. Ladd, Spatially Targeted Economic Development Strategies: Do They Work?, 1
CITYSCAPE 193, 206-07 (1994) (making an argument similar to James').
61. See Patrick G. Grasso & Scott B. Crosse, Enterprise Zones: Maryland Case Study,
in ENTERPRISE ZONES, supra note 54, at 122, 130-32 (indicating growth stemmed primarily
from increased demand for goods and services, not from the program).
62. See Richard C. Elling & Ann W. Sheldon, Comparative Analyses of State Enterprise
Zone Programs,in ENTERPRISE ZONES, supra note 54, at 136, 150 (allowing, however, that
"[s]tate differences in uncontrollable costs presumably matter most for firms considering
interstate relocation of operations"); Leslie E. Papke, What Do We Know About Enterprise
Zones, in TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 37 (James Poterba ed., 1993).
63. Ladd, supra note 60, at 207 (commenting on enterprise zones in both England and
the United States).
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to represent a promising strategy for addressing the problems of poor inner
city neighborhoods." 64
The extent to which jobs created in enterprise zones have gone to
neighborhood residents is also disputed. Erickson reports that, on average,
about two-thirds of the jobs saved or created are filled by people who live
within the designated communities.65 On the other hand, an evaluation of
Indiana enterprise zones concludes that less than one fifth of the jobs were
6
filled by zone residents. 6
One of the reasons neighborhood residents may not have higher rates
of employment in enterprise zones is that they lack the skills required for
the jobs created. Partly in response to this concern, the new federal Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities Program enacted by Congress in 199367 includes significant incentives for job training and social
services. Nine "empowerment zones" have been created, six in urban areas
and three in rural portions of the country.6 Employers located in Empowerment Zones will receive a tax credit for each worker who lives in the
zone worth up to twenty percent of the worker's first $15,000 in salary.
Empowerment zone businesses will also be eligible to take advantage of
expanded tax exempt bond financing and advantageous capital expense
rules. In addition, each Empowerment Zone will receive $100 million in
federal grants to be used for social service and economic development programs in the zone.
It is still much too early to assess whether empowerment zones vill
achieve the twin objectives of increasing economic development in
predominantly poor, inner city neighborhoods and employing a significant
number of neighborhood residents. Some analysts have criticized city
plans for spending the federal grant funds on programs that are not geared
to promote private enterprise and job creation. 9 Others doubt that the
resources committed to the program will be sufficient to turn around distressed communities. 70

64. Avis C. V'idal, ReintegratingDisadvantagedCommunities into the Fabric of Urban
Life: The Role of Community Development, 6 HoUsING PoL'y DEBATE 169, 188 (1995).
65. Erickson, supra note 56, at 175.
66. Ladd, supra note 60, at 204.

67. Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 543 (1993).
68. An additional 95 enterprise communities were created which receive more limited

forms of assistance. Id.
69. See, e.g., Mitchell L. Moss, Where's the Power in the Empowerment Zone?, Crtn
JoumRAT, Spring 1995, at 76, 80 (commenting on New York's empowerment zone).

70. See Vidal, supranote 64, at 187 (raising concerns that empowerment zone funds are
inadequate to address neighborhood problems). See also Harry . Holzer, Black Employment Problems: New Evidence, Old Questions, 13 J. POL'Y ANALYsis & Mmr. 699, 715

(1994) (doubting that enterprise zones will be cost-effective).
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III.
CDCs AND COMMUNITY-BASED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The limited success of traditional economic development initiatives in
benefiting residents of distressed, inner city neighborhoods has caused residents in many of these communities to seek alternative methods of promoting economic enterprise. Frequently, community economic development is
carried out by CDCs. The modem CDC has its roots in the late 1960s.
CDCs were frequently formed by residents of communities in response to
neighborhood controversies such as slum clearance and financial institution
redlining. 7 1 Many of the early CDCs received funds from the federal Office of Economic Opportunity and, later, the Community Services Administration. In addition, philanthropies such as the Ford Foundation took an
active role in nurturing CDCs, most notably the Bedford Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation.7 2
In addition to housing, the so-called "first generation" CDCs engaged
in a significant amount of economic development. Some developed shopping centers and financed small businesses in their communities. Several
actually began enterprises themselves or purchased stores or factories that
would otherwise have gone out of business. Despite innovative strategies,
many of these CDCs had only limited success in economic development.
Job creation was difficult as was maintaining profitability.7 3 Financial difficulties mounted with the loss of many federal subsidies in the 1980s. According to several accounts, many of the business ventures set up by CDCs
during the 1960s and 1970s failed.7 4
CDCs experienced a resurgence in activity in the late 1980s and 1990s.
As the federal government reduced subsidies to developers of low income
housing, CDCs frequently stepped into the void, patching together several
forms of government subsidy, private equity, and debt finance to construct
low income housing. 75 In the early 1990s, Congress rewarded CDC efforts
71. See NEAL R. PEIRCE & CAROL F. STEINBACH, CORRECTIVE CAPITALISM: THE Rise
OF AMERICA'S COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, REPORT TO THE FORD FOUNDATION 19-26 (1987) (detailing the history of CDC's).
72. See ROBERT HALPERN, REBUILDING THE INNER

CITY: A HISTORY OF NEIOHBORHOOD INITIATIVES To ADDRESS POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 132-33 (1995) (showing

that Ford Foundation contributions almost equal those of the federal government); Mitchell

Sviridoff, The Seeds of Urban Revival, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, Winter 1994, at 82, 94.
73. See HALPERN, supra note 72, at 136 (detailing the huge financial and human

re-

sources required to create each job and to maintain profits).
74. See PEIRCE & STEINBACH, supra note 71, at 30-31 (citing overambitious agendas as
a key contributing factor in the failure of many first generation CDCs); HALPERN, supra
note 72, at 138-39 (citing overambition and an emphasis on individual minority entrepreneurs instead of overall community development as reasons for the failure of early CDCs).
75. See Schill, supra note 1, at 78-81 (describing the various sources and methods used
to finance the preconstruction expenses, project equity, and debt finance aspects of low
income housing projects).
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in the housing arena by legislating mandatory set-asides for nonprofit organizations under several housing programs. 76 A 1994 census of CDCs by the
National Congress For Community Economic Development (NCCED)
demonstrates their significant achievements. According to the census, between 2,000 and 2,200 CDCs in the United States have produced approximately 400,000 units of affordable housing."
A significant number of modem CDCs include economic development
as part of their mission. According to the 1994 NCCED census, 23% of
CDCs reported completing industrial or commercial developments.78 In
addition, 18% indicated that they were involved in business lending, equity
investing, or owning and operating a business enterprise. 9
CDCs typically finance economic development projects by combining
several sources of equity and debt. Among the most important sources of
funding for CDC projects are grants from the Urban and Rural Economic
Development Program of the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services Office of Community Services (OCS). In 1995, the OCS made
available to CDCs over $23 million to establish business development
projects in disadvantaged communities.80 In addition, many projects utilize
grants and loans from the Economic Development Administration (EDA),
the Small Business Administration (SBA), and the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD). States and municipalities often
contribute Community Development Block Grant funds and below market
interest rate loans. In addition, cities frequently provide land to CDCs for
nominal prices. CDCs also frequently receive grants or loans from foundations, local corporations, and financial institutions.8 1 In some instances,
economic development financing comes from national intermediaries such
76. For example, states must set aside 10% of their annual allocation of Low Incorpe
Housing Tax Credits for nonprofit housing developers under I.R.C. § 42(a), (h), (s) (1988);
municipalities must earmark 15% of their HOME Investment Partnerships grants for nonprofit housing developers under the Cranston-Gonzales National Affordable Housing Act

of 1990 § 231, 42 U.S.C. § 12771 (1990). See Schill, supranote 1, at 86-87 (describing several
programs enacted by Congress in the early 1990s to encourage private sector investment in
low and middle-income housing projects).
77. NATIONAL CONGRESS FOR CoMuNrrY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, TYING IT ALL
TOGETHER: THE Coiw EHENSrvE AcwEvFmNrs OF COMMtUNITY-BASED DEVELOPMENr
ORGANIZATIONS 1 (1995) [hereinafter NCCED, TYING IT ALL TOGETMER].

78. Id. at 11.
79. Id.
80. Under the terms of the program, 75% of the jobs created must be filled by low
income residents of the community. Request for Applications Under the Office of Community Services' Fiscal Year 1995 Discretionary Grants Program, 60 Fed. Reg. 2103, 2105
(1995).
81. In many instances local financial institutions invest in CDC economic development
projects to fulfill their obligations under the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, 12
U.S.C. §§ 2901-2907 (1996). See generally KEN= H. THoMfAs, ComMM NY REiuvEsrmENT Act PER-omAacE: MACNG CRA WORK FOR BANmS, CohaNmEs AND REGULATORS (1993) (presenting a comprehensive examination of over twelve thousand CRA

ratings and giving a detailed analysis of over six thousand public evaluations). Under the
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as the Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC). 2 Occasionally, equity interests in projects are sold directly to private investors.
CDCs engage in economic development activities to achieve a variety
of objectives. Among the most central of CDC purposes is community
building, recreating the social fabric and institutions of distressed inner city
neighborhoods.83 Therefore, one objective common to virtually all CDCs
is the desire to generate economic opportunity and jobs for the residents of
their communities. A second reason many seek to promote commercial
development and business enterprise is to provide needed services for their
communities. Many inner city neighborhoods lack high quality retail stores
and commercial services. 84 Because of high residential densities, effective
demand in these neighborhoods may be substantial despite the relatively
low incomes of residents. 85 Nevertheless, externalities, high security costs,
fear of community opposition, and a lack of information may cause entrepreneurs from outside the neighborhood to avoid opening potentially lucrative stores and offices. Those stores and services that do exist in these
communities frequently charge higher prices than comparable businesses in
other neighborhoods.86 CDC economic development activities frequently
seek to meet community demand for high quality goods and services at
competitive prices. By providing outlets within their neighborhoods, they
also hope to capture a greater share of the retail purchases of residents and
Community Reinvestment Act, federal regulators are empowered to deny approval to financial institutions which wish to obtain new charters or merge with or purchase other institutions if they fail to meet the credit needs of their communities. § 2903(a)(1).
82. LISC was created by the Ford Foundation in 1979 to serve as an intermediary between private foundations and corporations and CDCs. According to information provided
by LISC, the organization has helped more than 1,300 CDCs throughout the nation build or
rehabilitate 57,000 units of housing and create 9.6 million square feet of commercial and
industrial space. LISC has raised $1.7 billion from 1,400 corporations, foundations, individuals, and public agencies. LISC, Local Initiatives Support Corporation (undated). One of
LISC's most ambitious programs is the Retail Initiative, a $24 million dollar fund to provide
community development corporations with equity to build low income communities shopping centers with supermarkets. See $24 M Fund to Build City Supermarkets, 6 THE LISC
LiNK 1 (1995).
83. See Vidal, supra note 64, at 212-13. Vidal notes that many CDCs engage in community building in addition to their physical and economic development work. These community building activities may involve organizing neighborhood residents to address issues of
importance to the community; such as advocacy, housing development or the delivery of
needed neighborhood services.
84. See Marc Bendick, Jr. & Mary Lou Egan, Linking Business Development and Community Development in Inner Cities, 8 J. PLANNING LITERATURE 3, 6 (1993) (observing that
inner city areas are "under-stored.").
85. See Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of the Inner City 18 (June
1994) (unpublished paper, on file with the Review of Law & Social Change) (reporting that
although inner city Boston has a 21% lower average income than the rest of the city, its
spending power per acre is 5.6% higher than surrounding suburbs).
86. See RES. AND POL'Y COMM., COMM. FOR ECONOMIC DEv., REBUILDINO INNERCITY CoMMNmnEs: A NEW APPROACH TO THE NATION'S URBAN CRISIS (1995) (observing

that in many inner city areas, "the nearest shopping center is miles away, and the retailing
that is available offers only a minimal selection of poor-quality products at high prices.").
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thereby support increased levels of economic activity.s 7 Some CDCs may
also involve themselves in economic development activities to earn income
that can be used to support their other activities such as housing, social
services, or advocacy.'
CDCs engage in a wide variety of economic development initiatives.
Among the roles they play are: (1) development catalyst, (2) developer/
landlord, and (3) equity investors in business enterprises.69
A.

Development Catalyst

Instead of actually taking an equity stake in economic development
projects, CDCs may facilitate the plans of others by acting as planners or
intermediaries. In many cities, CDCs operate revolving loan funds that
provide financing to indigenous entrepreneurs. For example, between 1990
and 1995 the Bedford Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation made 19 loans
to businesses owned by women and minorities in Brooklyn. These loans,
which ranged in amount from $5,000 to $150,000, were used to help entrepreneurs start businesses as well as to enable existing firms to expand or
remain in business. 90 The revolving loan fund is capitalized with over
$850,000 provided by the EDA, the New York State Urban Development
Corporation, and the Restoration Corporation, itself. Interest rates are
typically set at the prime rate. As loans are repaid the money is loaned out
to other eligible recipients. 91 Of the 19 loans made as of 1994, one had
defaulted and one was severely delinquent.
CDCs may also specialize in providing technical assistance to community entrepreneurs. For example, in Washington, D.C., the Latino Economic Development Corporation helps neighborhood businesses obtain
SBA loans by working with them to develop acceptable business plans.
Faculty from Howard University are enlisted to work with the CDC and
the loan applicants. The program has been operational since the early
1990s and has thus far resulted in seven approved loans and an additional
six in process.
87. See Bendick & Egan, supra note 84, at 8 (discussing "multiplier effects" of
purchases within a community).
88. See Herbert J.Rubin, Renewing Hope in the Inner City: Conversationswith Community-Based Development Practitioners,27 ADmuN. & Soc'y 127, 137 (1995) (discussing

business activities of CDCs that cross-subsidize social service programs).
89. Much of the material in the following sections is based on telephone interviews
with representatives of more than a dozen CDCs. The interviews were conducted by the
author in 1994 (with some follow-up in 1996) and the CDCs were selected based upon discussions with housing and community development professionals and a search of newspaper
articles in the Westlaw and NEXIS databases.
90. Among the recipients are service and retail industries, light manufacturing enterprises, and a couple of restaurants.
91. The maximum term for the loans is five to seven years.
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Some CDCs further community economic development objectives primarily by operating job training facilities as part of their social service mission. One of the most ambitious programs is run by Esperanza Unida in
Milwaukee. The CDC provides city residents with job training in enterprises it owns including auto repair and body shops, a welding company,
and a restaurant. After the six month training program is over, Esperanza
Unida helps the trainees obtain jobs in private businesses. Although the
CDC charges customers of the auto shops and the restaurant for services
provided, most of the enterprises, themselves, are not profitable.
B. Developer/Landlord
Perhaps the most common CDC economic development activity is the
development and leasing of commercial real estate. For example, following
the 1980 riots in Liberty City, the Tacolcy Economic Development Corporation was founded to promote redevelopment of the neighborhood. In
addition to several housing developments, Tacolcy built Edison Plaza, a
48,000 square foot shopping center. 9- Edison Plaza was financed by grants
and loans provided by the City of Miami, the EDA, LISC, and the Ford
Foundation. Its anchor tenant is a Winn-Dixie supermarket which, at least
symbolically, replaced a Pantry Pride market that had been burned down
during the civil unrest. The supermarket has found its location in Edison
Plaza to be profitable. In fact, in part due to Winn Dixie's desire for more
space, CDC has plans to demolish the existing shopping center and build in
its place a much larger development. Despite the profitability of the stores
in the center, Tacolcy has not made a profit from its operation of the development. Instead, it subsidizes the shopping center with revenues from
other sources.
Although retail developments seem to be more typical of CDC real
estate ventures, some organizations also own properties that are devoted to
industrial or wholesale purposes. For example, in Boston, the Neighborhood Development Corporation of Jamaica Plain purchased a five acre site
that had been used until the mid-1960s as a brewery. With money provided
by the OCS, loans from the state, and bank financing, it rehabilitated over
one hundred thousand square feet of space for manufacturing. The buildings in the Brewery project currently are home to 28 small businesses employing 140 people, many of whom come from the Jamaica Plain
neighborhood. Among the businesses are a Samuel Adams micro-brewery,
food processing plants, woodworking, and building supply manufacturers.
92. See NATIONAL
IN THE MARKETPLACE

CONGRESS FOR COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, A PLACE
8 (1992) [hereinafter NCCED, A PLACE IN THE MARKETPLACE];

Technically, Edison Plaza is owned by Belfonte Tacolcy Center, a nonprofit organization
that was originally run by the founder of Tacolcy Economic Development Corporation.
Nevertheless, Tacolcy Economic Development Corporation developed the property and is
in charge of management.
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NDC does its own day-to-day management and, at present, the buildings'
rents-cover their costs.
C. Equity Investor in Business Enterprise
During the 1980s, a number of CDCs sought to take a more active role
in community economic development by becoming equity investors in business enterprises. In some instances, they would invest capital, both financial and human, in joint ventures with profit-motivated businesses.
Probably the most widely celebrated CDC to engage in this type of activity
is the New Community Corporation in Newark. Like several other CDCs,
New Community grew out of the riots of the 1960s. Community residents
in Newark's Central Ward, a predominantly low income, black neighborhood, banded together to improve their community under the leadership of
an energetic and charismatic priest, Father William J. Linder. Since the
late 1960s, New Community has built or renovated ten major housing developments in Newark and serves as a landlord to over 6,000 tenants. 93
New Community also provides a wide variety of social services to community residents such as child and health care.
In addition to housing and social services, New Community has developed an office complex and a shopping center. The shopping center cost 16
million dollars to develop and was financed using a federal Urban Development Action Grant, a state development loan, a grant from the city's
Community Development Block Grant allocation, and a loan from Prudential.94 The centerpiece of the development is a 43,000 square foot
Pathmark supermarket. Under the terms of its arrangement with
Pathmark, New Community owns two-thirds of the equity in the Pathmark
store while Supermarkets General, the parent company of Pathmark, owns
the other one-third. 95 Pathmark operates the store under a management
agreement and is entitled to a management fee for its efforts. 6 Any profits
generated by the store are shared between the two joint venturers in proportion to their equity interests.97
93. Renewing the Economic Development Administration: New Approaches to Economic Developmen Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economic Growth and Credit Formation of the House Comm. on Banking, Fin. and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 340,
341 (1994) (testimony of Raymond M. Codey of the New Community Corporation)
(describing the work of New Community Corporation).
94. ROBERT GusND & NEA. PEiRcE, AoAtNST THE TrE THE NEw Co.w~uNrry
CORPORATION 1968-1993 24-25 (undated).
95. FOOD MARKETING INsTuTE, JoiNr VEruRF IN THE INNER Crry- SupiAR.
Ks GENRA CORPORATION AND NEW CoMM UzNrY CoRPoR ,roN 2 (undated).
96. Pathmark has a similar arrangement with the Bedford Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation. See Elliot Zwiebach, PaneL Inner-City Stores Need Community Support, SuPt.ukRcET NEws, Feb. 8, 1993, at 11 (excerpt of statement from Jack Futterman, CEO of
Supermarkets General Holdings Corporation, the parent company of Pathmark).
97. FOOD MARKETING INsTrrxE, supra note 95, at 2.
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Beyond leasing the land and providing a share of the capital, New
Community plays a limited role in the operation of the Pathmark. Members of New Community sit on the board of the corporation that owns the
store and provide assistance in hiring, security, product selection, and promotional efforts. Nevertheless, day-to-day operating authority is vested in
Pathmark pursuant to the management agreement.
The Pathmark store has been hailed by many as an overwhelming success. It employs 200 people, many of whom come from the Central Ward. 98
The quality of its merchandise is good and its prices are, according to one
source, 38% less than neighborhood convenience stores. 99 According to
Supermarkets General, the store's sales-per-square foot exceed company
averages. The store is profitable, although neither the company nor New
Community release information that permits comparisons with other
supermarkets. 100
New Community's joint venture with Pathmark provides an example
of a CDC taking an equity interest in a business enterprise, yet not actually
running the entity. Some CDCs, however, go beyond this role and become
both owners and managers of businesses. In some instances, the business is
closely related to the CDC's mission. For example, New Community operates a chain of child care centers and a long term health care facility. 10 1 In
other cases, the enterprise may have little to do with the CDC's organizational objectives other than bringing to the community jobs and capital.
For example, until recently, CDC of Kansas City owned and operated
Builders Block, a factory that produces cement blocks for construction.
The company was purchased by CDC in the mid 1980s with a grant from
the OCS and bank loans. When owned by CDC, the plant employed thirty
workers and, at least in some years, grossed $2 million. According to CDC,
the plant had been profitable for two years prior to its sale.
IV.
CDCs

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:
FOR THE APPROPRIATE ROLE

AND

SEARCHING

In the concluding section of this article, I assess the role of CDCs in
urban economic development as well as the strategy of urban economic
development itself. The first section describes the difficulties entailed in
evaluating the economic development activities of CDCs. The second section examines existing evidence on the performance of CDCs and seeks to
draw some conclusions about which activities seem most successful. The
98. Id.
99. Id. at 3; see also Andrew C. Revkin, A Market Scores a Success in Newark, N.Y.
TimEs, Apr. 30, 1995, at 39 (describing Pathmark's success in Newark's Central Ward).

100. Telephone Interview with Stanley Sorkin, Vice President of Public Affairs at Supermarkets General.
101. GUSKIND & PEIRCE, supra note 94, at 26-31 (discussing New Community's Babyland Nursery, which as of 1993 cared for 640 children in six child care centers).
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final section critically
development.
A.

773

examines the concept of urban economic

The Difficulties of Evaluating CDC Performance

Remarkably little careful analysis has been done, to date, to evaluate
the success of CDCs in community economic development. One of the
reasons for this absence of research is uncertainty over what standard to
use in evaluating their performance. CDCs engage in economic development activities for a wide variety of social and economic objectives. Nevertheless, the farther these organizations venture away from what are
conventionally thought to be charitable activities (e.g. social services, housing for the indigent), the more difficult it is not to compare their performance to existing actors in the marketplace. For example, few people would
expect a CDC that owns and operates transitional housing for the homeless
to be as profitable as a private landlord catering to middle income tenants.
Nevertheless, can the same be said of a CDC that rents space in a shopping
center to a large chain store or to a nonprofit organization that operates a
plant manufacturing cement blocks?
In some instances, holding CDCs to the same standards as profit-motivated enterprises may be unwise. A large element of the justification for
CDCs lies not with concepts of economic efficiency, but instead with the
desire to promote redistributive objectives. Despite many examples to the
contrary, in some neighborhoods it may not be cost-effective to locate low
price, high quality food stores. Nevertheless, we may believe that it would
be unfair to deprive residents of these services and thus be willing to subsidize them through government grants or loans. For similar reasons, society
may feel that low income people should have more economic resources and
therefore be willing to promote economic development activities in
predominantly poor communities as a way of supplementing income. 102
Furthermore, comparisons with profit-motivated entrepreneurs may
be inappropriate even if the norm that guides the evaluator is economic
efficiency. It is likely that CDCs generate at least some benefits that resemble public goods. Several CDCs have redeveloped shopping centers or
office buildings, even though the rents that the spaces command would not
justify similar investments by private real estate developers. Nevertheless,
these investments might be justified on the ground that they create positive
externalities in otherwise deteriorated neighborhoods as new supermarkets
replace abandoned and dangerous industrial plants. A second form of public benefit may be the willingness of CDCs to hire people from their communities in preference to other seemingly more qualified and, at least
initially, more productive employees. Employment and job training might
102. Economic development subsidies may be viewed as a substitute for public assistance programs. To the extent policymakers believe cash grants create dependency, subsidizing the creation of jobs should alleviate some of these perceived negative effects.
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permit these residents to become productive contributors to the economy
instead of recipients of public assistance. In addition, to the extent that
Wilson's theories are correct, increased numbers of working people in inner city communities may generate role models for youths and make labor
force participation the norm rather than the exception. Furthermore, and
of considerable importance to CDC advocates, participation in CDCs may
"empower" community residents to take control of their neighborhoods,
10 3
fight crime, and create strong and stabilizing social institutions.
Nevertheless despite redistributive objectives and the possibility of
generating public goods, CDCs must be held accountable to some standard
of performance, particularly in light of the substantial public revenues that
they receive.' 04 In light of the scarce resources available for urban programs, CDCs should be expected to operate in as efficient a manner as is
compatible with their public objectives. Managerial incompetence or
wastefulness cannot be excused, no matter how noble the cause. Furthermore, to the extent that the activity undertaken by the CDC is not directly
related to the redistributive or public goods justifications offered above for
CDC economic development activities, but instead more closely resembles
an activity typically undertaken by profit-motivated entrepreneurs, a
stronger case can be made for holding them to the same standard as other
participants in the economy.
B. Assessing The Economic Development Record of CDCs
Economic development is a very risky undertaking, a lesson many first
generation CDCs learned the hard way. Most CDCs undertake economic
development activities only after they develop a solid track record in housing production. 10 5 Although they share some risks in common such as susceptibility to cost overruns and neighborhood change, at least in some
respects, economic development may be more risky than housing production and management. Even though the construction and rehabilitation of
low income housing often requires familiarity with complex business structures, CDCs and their attorneys have developed models which, more often
103. See, e.g., Paul S. Grogan, Proof Positive: A Community-Based Solution to
America'sAffordable Housing Crisis,7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV.159, 163 (1996) (discussing
CDC role as community "anchors."); NCCED, TYING IT ALL TOGETHER, supra note 77, at
1 ("Through CDCs, residents work together to achieve the economic and social revival of
their communities ...."); Sviridoff, supra note 72, at 96 (describing "the more ambitious
mission of CDCs, namely, the rebuilding of shattered communities socially as well as physically and economically."). See also MERCER L. SULLIVAN, MORE THAN HOUSING: How
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS Go ABOUT CHANGING LIVES AND NEIOH.
BORHOODS (1993) (reporting on the first phase of a research project to analyze social revitalization activities of CDCs).
104. In addition to government grants and loans, CDCs receive funds from foundations, which are entitled to receive tax deductible donations.
105. See Avis C. VIDAL, REBUILDING COMMUNITIES: A NATIONAL STUDY OF URBAN
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS 76 (1992) (reporting that CDCs typically begin
their economic development activities with housing).
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then not, they can replicate. Because economic development activities are
more diverse than low income housing, it is consequently much more difficult to create replicable patterns for transactions. For example, the skills
and knowledge necessary to plan and operate an industrial structure may
be very different from those required to develop and manage a retail shopping strip. Even more difficult is the planning, execution, and management
of an operating business. Insufficient knowledge or experience may easily
cause economic development activities to fail, leading the CDC to lose
scarce capital and prestige.
In addition to the greater difficulty of putting together commercial
ventures, it is also likely that market demand would be harder to predict.
In light of the shortage of affordable housing in many central cities, most
nonprofit housing providers are likely to continue to face demand that outstrips supply. 10 6 As the recent boom and bust in the commercial real estate
market demonstrate, the same cannot be said for owners of non-residential
properties. Competition from other developments may undermine the viability of CDC shopping strips; oversupply of office space may drive down
rents. In addition, even in the absence of changing market conditions, current tenants may go out of business leaving the CDC with no income and
burdensome carrying costs. Even greater difficulties are likely to exist for
CDCs that own operating businesses. Not only must they correctly anticipate the future direction of input prices, but they must also gauge future
demand in specialized product markets.
To date, only one study by Vidal' 0 7 has gathered information systematically on the success or failure of modem CDC economic development activities. The author surveyed 130 well established CDCs; 87 were involved
in commercial real estate and 75 supported business enterprise development.10 8 Failure was defined rather broadly to include, in addition to the
complete collapse of an activity, major cost overruns, poor quality construction, over-estimation of demand resulting in high vacancies and poor
management. 10 9 Vidal found that housing development was the least risky
activity, with failure rates ranging from 17% to 38%, depending upon the
number of years the CDC had been in operation. 110 Failure rates for commercial real estate development were a bit higher ranging from 18% to
40%. The least successful activity, by far, was business enterprise development. Among organizations that had worked in the area for fifteen years
106. Nonprofit housing developers will typically lease their units to tenants at rents
that are substantially below prevailing market levels. One reason for this is the charitable
mission of these groups. A second reason is that most of this housing received subsidies or
tax credits and therefore must be operated pursuant to government regulations that require
sustained affordability.
107. ViDAL, supra note 105, at 65-73.
108. Id. at 63.

109. 1& at 77-78.
110. Id. at 78.
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or less, failure rates ranged from 28% to 47%.111 Among the five CDCs

that had pursued business enterprise development for over fifteen years, all
had experienced failures. 112 When asked to explain what had led to project
were poor or inadefailures, the most common responses offered by CDCs113
quate planning or insufficient organizational capacity.
Anecdotal accounts also suggest that CDCs might be well advised to
avoid acquiring their own operating companies, at least when the businesses are unrelated to the charitable missions or expertise of the CDCs.
Like many small businesses begun by profit-motivated entrepreneurs," 4
CDC businesses are seldom successful over the long run and sometimes
can cause the organizations to lose substantial sums of money. For example, flush from its successful development of Edison Plaza, Tacolcy Economic Development Corporation in Miami purchased a fish restaurant in
1992. Its officers soon realized that they knew little about operating restaurants, lost money, and closed the restaurant. The establishment is now being operated by an experienced restauranteer, apparently at a profit. A
similar experience was encountered by Bethel New Life Corporation when
it constructed a state-of-the-art recycling plant in a distressed community in
Chicago. The CDC lacked experience in the business and lost money until
it sold the plant to a private, profit-motivated company that specialized in
paper products.
In addition to possible financial losses, CDCs that engage in economic
development activities also run the risk of encountering internal conflicts
over the groups' objectives. For example, one of the tenets of the CDC
movement is community "empowerment." Community residents are supposed to take an active role in running the CDC and thereby take control
over their lives and their community's future. Nevertheless, as the complexity of CDC activities increases, the likelihood that modestly educated
neighborhood residents will have meaningful input into decisions is likely
to decline.
Another conflict among objectives might occur to the extent that business goals do not correspond with social objectives. A recent example of
this difficulty involved the Third Ward Partnership in Chicago, a CDC created by Alderwoman Dorothy Tillman. The Partnership formed a joint
venture with a local real estate developer, Matanky Realty Group, to build
111. Id.
112. Id. See also Helen Mazarakis, Community Based Economic Development: Are
CDCs Up To The Challenge?, SHELTERFORCE, Jan./Feb. 1994, at 4, 6 (observing that LISC
experienced significantly lower loan repayment rates for business enterprise loans than for
housing development projects).

113.

VIDAL,

supra note 105, at 78-79.

114. See Timothy Bates, Why Do Minority Business Development Programs Generate

So Little Minority Business Development?, 9 ECON. Div. Q. 3,5 (1995) (reporting that over

70% of loans made to new minority business enterprises by the SBA defaulted); Bendick &
Egan, supra note 84, at 5 (describing the difficulties of small businesses, particularly those
located in inner cities).
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a shopping center on the southern edge of the Robert Taylor Homes. One
of the conditions required by the CDC was that the operator of the supermarket be a minority resident from the community. The CDC insisted on
this condition despite the fact that an experienced minority entrepreneur
could not be located. In the end, someone with little experience signed a
lease and defaulted on his obligations, which led permanent lenders to refuse to extend credit. The construction lender foreclosed its mortgage
causing Matanky and the Third Ward Partnership to lose their equity
interests. 1 5
C. Economic Development As A Strategy For Inner Cities
CDC community development initiatives, as well as the more traditional forms of economic development cities have used for decades, present
an additional issue that must be addressed. Efforts to promote the growth
of jobs and economic activity in central cities fly in the face of strong market forces that have tended to disfavor inner city locations. These forces
explain why many of these initiatives have had only limited success and
why most require substantial public subsidies. Although one can create a
number of creative economic arguments based upon market failure to justify government intervention to spur central city economic growth on the
grounds of economic efficiency," 6 it is very likely that many of the subsidy
programs now in existence promote an inefficient allocation of societal resources. Of course, these inefficiencies may well be a small price to pay for
the achievement of objectives that have nothing to do with economic efficiency, such as a more equitable distribution of income.
Yet it is not clear that focussing government and philanthropic attention on community economic development is necessarily in the best interests of inner city residents. Questions of economic efficiency aside, given
the political climate in America as we approach the twenty-first century, it
is inconceivable that government will appropriate the sums necessary to
reverse decades of urban decline. Instead, we are faced with the prospect
of continued racial and economic segregation, of children continuing to
grow up in neighborhoods where they will face tremendous disadvantages
including overwhelming poverty, mediocre education, and the prevalence
115. A somewhat different type of conflict, not unique to economic development activities, occurs as a result of the dependence of CDCs on government for their financial sup-

port. CDCs often begin their existence as advocates for the interests of community
residents. Frequently, this advocacy leads to confrontations with local governments and
business interests. This advocacy role might be compromised by the necessity for CDCs to
look to government and businesses for dollars to support their activities. Cf. Rubin, supra
note 88, at 140-42 (describing concerns of CDCs with maintaining autonomy).
116. Among the arguments that are at least plausible are that government action might
be useful to counteract insufficient information about inner city economic opportunities,
negative externalities, and transaction costs that might make coordinated investment by private firms difficult.
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of harmful social norms. CDCs have and will make heroic efforts to ameliorate these conditions by building communities, but these battles will be
hard won and the victories difficult to maintain.
A more balanced agenda to ameliorate the problems of concentrated
inner city poverty would also facilitate efforts by inner city residents to
move to areas of greater opportunity. The evidence I presented in Part I
suggests that job opportunities for low skilled workers are greater in the
suburbs and in regions outside the Northeast and Midwest. At present,
inner city residential locations impede individuals from obtaining these
jobs because of excessively long commutes, the absence of information
about job openings and the stereotypes used by employers. A mobility or
"deconcentration" strategy 117 that assists poor families in moving from inner city communities also would enable children to grow up in communities
where they could obtain higher quality educations and live in safer environments away from peer group influences that inhibit their social mobility.
The Gautreaux Assisted Housing Program"18 provides the best evidence, to date, on the potential for a deconcentration strategy to assist inner city residents. Under the program, applicants for public housing in
Chicago were offered up to three homes in either the city or the suburbs.
The homes were owned by private landlords and subsidized by housing
vouchers or certificates. Sociologists from Northwestern University have
interviewed participants over several years to evaluate the effects of deconcentration. Overall, the findings of these studies suggest very positive
results.
One set of studies examined the educational experiences of children.
A comparison of youths who had moved to the suburbs seven years earlier
with those who had moved within the city shows that the suburban residents had a much lower school drop-out rate and significantly higher college attendance rates. They also tended to earn higher salaries than youths

117. Elements of such a strategy would include expanded use of housing vouchers, a
relaxation of local regulations that impede construction of affordable housing, and enhanced enforcement of anti-discrimination laws. See Michael H. Schill, Distressed Public
Housing: Where Do We Go From Here?, 60 U. Ci. L. REv. 497,526-54 (1993); Schill, supra
note 14, at 831-52.
118. The Gautreaux program derives its name from the remedy ordered by a federal
court in Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1974), aff'd sub
nom., Hills v. Gautreaux, 435 U.S. 284 (1976). The lawsuit involved a challenge by residents
of the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) to discriminatory practices of HUD and the
CHA. The court in Gautreaux ordered the CHA and HUD to provide housing opportunities for minority public housing applicants in non-segregated areas of Chicago as well as its
suburbs.
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who remained in the city.11 9 Less positively, a greater proportion of suburban students were placed in special education and experienced racial discrimination.12 0 Nevertheless, mothers expressed greater satisfaction with
121
teachers and schools in the suburbs as compared to the city.
Other studies examined the experiences of the Gautreaux mothers.
Suburban residents had a higher probability of being employed although
differences in wages were not statistically significant.122 In terms of neighborhood satisfaction, suburban movers were more satisfied than their urban counterparts with neighborhood safety, police protection, and schools,
but less happy with transportation and health care.1M With respect to social integration, the responses were also positive. Suburban movers interacted with their neighbors more often than those who remained in the city;
children were as socially integrated into their communities as their urban
counterparts."2 Nevertheless a significant proportion of the suburban
movers at one point since their move have felt isolated and experienced
discrimination. These negative experiences, however, diminished in frequency over time.125
Despite its advantages, deconcentration of the inner city poor is not a
complete strategy for alleviating the hardships of inner city residents. The
opposition of suburban residents to an influx of low income residents, 12 6
119. James E. Rosenbaum, Black Pioneers- Do Their Moves to the Suburbs Increase
Economic Opportunityfor Mothers and Children?, 2 HousING POL'Y DEBAm 1179, 1198

(1991).
120. James E. Rosenbaum, Marilynn J. Kulieke & Leonard S. Rabinowitz, White Suburban Schools' Responses to Low-Income Black Children: Sources of Successes and
Problems,20 URn. REv. 28, 33, 39 (1988).
121. Id. at 38.
122. James E. Rosenbaum & Susan J.Popkin, Employment and Earnings of Low-Income Blacks Who Move to Middle-Class Suburbs, in THE

URBAN

UNDERCLASS 342, 350

(Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991).
123. James E. Rosenbaum & Susan J. Popkin, Economic and Social Impacts of Housing Integration 21 (Mar. 1990) (unpublished report, on file with the Review of Law & Social
Change).
124. James E. Rosenbaum, Leonard S. Rubinowitz, Marilynn J.Kulieke, Cheryl Coppell, Alicia McCareins, & Galen Carey, Low-Income Black Children in White Suburban
Schools 150-53 (1986) (unpublished report on file with the Review of Law & Social Change).
125. James E. Rosenbaum, Susan J. Popkin, Julie E. Kaufman & Jenifer Rusin, Social
Integrationof Low-Income Black Adults in Middle-Class White Suburbs,38 Soc. PRoB. 448,
455 (1991); Rosenbaum & Popkin, supra note 123, at 20.
126. Suburban opposition to an influx of low income, predominantly minority residents
from the inner city may be attributable to a number of motives. First, residents may wish to
preserve the uncrowded amenities of their municipalities and be disinclined to permit the
types of dense development that would make affordable housing feasible. Second, suburban residents may wish to exclude poor residents to maintain low tax rates and avoid redistribution. See SchiUl, supranote 14, at 811-17. Third, some residents may believe that it is
fundamentally unfair for families receiving public assistance to achieve the same lifestyle
that they have had to work for. See Howard Husock, A Critiqueof Mixed Income Housing:
The Problemswith "Gatreaux" [sic], 5 THm

RE=SPONSIVE

ComhtNrry 34,38 (1995) (discuss-

ing "unjust reward" reaction to deconcentration strategies). Fourth, some residents will be
frightened that former residents of the city will bring with them high crime rates and social
disorder. Fmally, the opposition of at least some segments of the population to low income
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insufficient funds for housing vouchers, and preferences among some inner
city residents for remaining in their current neighborhoods would ensure
that many poor people will remain in the inner city and continue to require
assistance from government and the voluntary sector. The efforts of CDCs
will therefore remain important, provided that they concentrate on those
activities that they achieve best, such as housing and the delivery of needed
community services. 127 Even more importantly, to the extent that CDCs
are successful at community building and restoring social fabric in inner
city communities, they may be able to create environments that enable residents to lift themselves out of poverty.
CONCLUSION

CDC community economic development activities are difficult to analyze dispassionately. The idea of groups of citizens banding together to
improve their lives and those of their neighbors is deeply ingrained as a
positive virtue in American society. 128 Furthermore, in many respects, the
plight of inner city America is not just the result of invisible market forces
inmigration may be attributable to racism. The recent experience of HUD's Moving To
Opportunity (MTO) Program in the Baltimore metropolitan area illustrates how difficult it
might be to achieve deconcentration. The MTO program involved giving vouchers to public
housing applicants for use in the suburbs. Community opposition in blue collar suburbs
surrounding Baltimore influenced the Senator from Maryland, then chairperson of the
HUD Appropriations Subcommittee, to substantially reduce funding for the program. See
Ed Brandt, Scare Tactics Bring Down A Federal Housing Program, BALTIMORE SUN, Oct.
30, 1994, at lB.
127. Indeed, before branching out to undertake more difficult and complex activities,
many CDCs might benefit from improving their own activities as housing providers. A
recent evaluation of nonprofit housing providers found some troubling evidence of management difficulties and financial problems "which, if unaddressed, will greatly threaten the
stock of affordable housing .... " RACHEL G. BRATTr, LANGLEY C. KEYES, ALEX
SCHWARTZ & Avis C. VIDAL, CONFRONTING THE MANAGEMENT CHALLENGE: AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 7 (1994). Evaluations of 34 developments found

that one-third had excessive rent collection backlogs and one-quarter had exterior physical
condition problems. Id. at 8. The study also revealed that many developments had insuffident capital and operating reserves and over half were spending more than they were earning in rent. Id. at 9. The financial difficulties of nonprofit housing are not solely
attributable to inefficient management practices. Many of the developments were financed
with insufficient equity and too much debt. In some cities, such as Chicago, housing developments or management authority have been taken away from nonprofit developers by
funders. See Tom Andreoli, Helter Shelter: Problems Plague Tax-Credit Housing, CRAIN'S
CHICAGO BusINEss, May 1, 1995, at 1 (describing problems of three CDCs in Chicago). In
other cities, such as Minneapolis, developments are undergoing refinancing and workouts
involving the infusion of more equity and more favorable loan terms. See Eric J. Wieffering,
"I am totally opposed to people using real estate as an investment tool:" The twisted econom.
ics of Minneapolis neighborhood nonprofits and low-income housing, CORP. REP. MINN.,
Mar. 1994, at 61 (criticizing the current approach of non-profit developers in developing
low-income housing).
128. This notion that voluntarism and self help are quintessentially American dates
back to the early days of the republic. See generally 2 ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOC.
RACY IN AMERICA ch. 5 (Henry Reeve trans. & Phillips Bradley ed., Alfred A. Knopf 1945)
(1840).
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or the characterological faults of the people residing in these communities.
Instead, the flight of the middle class from cities, deindustrialization, and
even the legal distinction between cities and suburbs, itself, have either
been facilitated or created by government.U-9
Nevertheless, CDCs and their supporters ignore the market at their
own peril. As this article has repeatedly stated, we need more and better
information about how well CDCs perform their activities. CDCs have accomplished much in difficult environments and under tremendous constraints. Their mission of providing housing, social services, and economic
opportunity is vital. Nevertheless, given their reliance upon public and
philanthropic support, they must not squander their economic capital, and
thereby their social capital, by engaging in activities that they do not do
well or that others do better. In addition, CDCs and their supporters must
not oversell what these organizations can deliver and ignore other, possibly
more promising, avenues for improving the lives of people living in the
inner city.

129. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 4 at 190-218 (examining the impact of federal housing policies on how and where Americans live); Michael H. Schill & Susan M. Wachter, The
Spatial Bias of Federal Housing Law and Policy: ConcentratedPoverty in Urban America,
143 U. PA. L. REv. 1285 (1995).
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